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ABSTRACT 
 
Mixed jurisdictions that are a historical by-product of the 
convergence of common and civil law traditions may give the 
impression of entities with stable and fixed traits. Upon a closer 
look however, this impression is found to be inaccurate. An 
analysis of court judgements is the best way to evaluate how these 
legal systems develop. This paper focuses on Maltese private law, 
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which is firmly rooted in the French legal tradition. Some issues 
concerning private law will be discussed solely because they are 
significant examples of the relevance that judgements have for the 
development of the system, notwithstanding the fact that the 
doctrine of binding precedent is not followed in Malta. Through an 
inquiry of specific issues not expressly provided for by the 
legislature, one can see if the legal system has evolved in a way 
which is coherent with the models that lie at its foundations or 
from which, and in what way, it has departed from them. In the 
case of Malta, foreign influences are incorporated to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Maltese legal tradition. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I will discuss how Court decisions may 
change the law in a mixed jurisdiction such as Malta. After an 
overview of the legal history of the system, I will address two 
closely connected points. The first concerns gaps in written law, or 
lacunae, and the ways in which they are filled by judges. The 
second point concerns how general rules such as the concept of 
‘good faith’ have been used by Courts to rule in situations that are 
not expressly provided for by law. The difference between the two 
points is one of degree, as in the first case the rule is created by 
judges within a wide space, whereas in the second there are 
provisions covering situations which are not expressly mentioned. 
In the first case, judicial discretion has as its result the introduction 
of a new rule. This approach allows a more detailed insight into 
mixed legal systems and allows us to understand the sense in 
which these jurisdictions can be classified as ‘mixed.’ In this 
respect, the formation of the legal system as a mixed one is very 
important.  
From the outset it has to be said that the most significant 
features of the Maltese system are: 1) the presence of codes; 2) the 
absence of the doctrine of binding precedent;1 and 3) the absence 
of a theoretical approach to law in the sense that a doctrinal 
                                                                                                             
 1. However, many examples can be found in which certain important 
judgements are followed very closely by Courts in later cases: a clear example 
of this can be found in the field of tort law, as to the computation of damage, in 
Butler v. Christopher Heard (Court of Appeal, December 22, 1967). 
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formant nowadays is basically non-existent.2 The ambit of this 
study is limited to private law.  
 
II. THE MALTESE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A MIXED JURISDICTION:  
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
Malta falls among those systems resulting from the mixture 
between the civil law family and the common law family, which is 
a specific mix that is sometimes called ‘Anglo-civilian.’3 An 
eminent scholar, in fact, has observed that within mixed 
jurisdictions, these two legal traditions separately affect different 
areas of law. English law affects public, commercial and 
procedural law, while civil law affects the field of private law.4  
These two traditions do not give rise to a ‘melted’ legal 
system, as is the normal result among nearly all legal systems, but 
in fact, each tradition operates within a distinct field of the legal 
system. 
According to one of the most eminent Maltese private 
lawyers,5 public law, maritime law and company law are oriented 
towards English common law whereas private law is based on a 
continental model. The fact that the models underlying both 
Maltese private law and public law are different has not been a 
                                                                                                             
 2. A foreign observer may be rather puzzled by the presence of two 
elements, indicated above as no.1 and 3, that usually do not fit well together. 
Usually, in codified systems academics serve the function of rationalizing their 
legal system through the interpretation of written law and by pointing out the 
flaws of the latter, as well as legal reforms that are necessary. However, in the 
Maltese legal system academics do not play this role. 
 3. V.V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL 
FAMILY (Cambridge University Press, 2001); J. Du Plessis, Comparative Law 
and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 478 (Reimann & Zimmermann, eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
 4. PALMER, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
 5. J.M. GANADO, BRITISH PUBLIC LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW IN MALTA, 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 195 (1950) (Maltese law has succeeded in making a 
happy union between British public law and its own private law, which belongs 
to the legal system derived from the Roman or the civil law. Even a cursory 
examination of the Maltese Civil Code reveals its close connection with the 
Code Napoleon, with the Italian Code and with other codes of Southern 
European nations. The combination of these two laws has been a feature in 
Maltese affairs for the last 140 years); see also, J.M. Ganado, Malta: A 
Microcosm of International Influences, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED 
AND MIXING 225 (Örűcű et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1996).  
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significant hurdle for the efficiency of the Maltese legal system, 
because both traditions are, “built upon an individualistic basis.”6  
As to maritime law,7 the British model was adopted during 
the first period of British rule, initially by establishing a Vice-
Admiralty Court presided over by an English judge and, then by 
adopting the Admiralty Courts Acts of 1840 and 1860, and the 
Colonial Courts of the Admiralty Act in 1890, all of which clearly 
influenced by British legislation. The adoption of the English 
model brought into the Maltese system rules which were 
completely foreign to its legal tradition. For example, the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1973 introduced maritime mortgages in a system 
which, up to that point, had only recognized hypothecs as the 
primary type of security interest. This was a particularly relevant 
change because the hypothec, being a civil law security, favours 
the debtor by requiring registration through a public notarial deed 
and does not rise to the level of a possessory right, whereas the 
mortgage favours the creditor and allows the mortgagee the right to 
take possession and sell the ship without recourse to the courts. 
In the field of carriage of goods by sea, the 1952 Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act is a carbon copy of its English counterpart. 
Furthermore, in the fields of carriage of goods and marine 
insurance, the Maltese courts also follow English sources of law to 
solve disputed points of law. However, within these fields, the 
application of the British model is not pure, and it is also of note 
that contract of carriage and bills of lading are governed by 
continental rules. 
Some fields are jointly affected by civil and common law. 
Within company law, for example, commercial partnerships en 
nom collectif and en commandite are based on French and Italian 
law, while limited liability companies follow English law, except 
with regard to issues of dissolution and liquidation, in which cases 
French law is followed.8 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 6. GANADO, supra at note 5, at 201.  
 7. Id. at 223-224. 
 8. Id. at 243-244. 
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III. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SOURCES OF LAW IN MALTA 
 
Because Malta has become ‘mixed,’ as previously defined, 
under British rule, it is necessary to understand how British law 
was received in Malta and the effects it produced on the pre-
existing Maltese legal tradition. It is generally believed that, rather 
than having been subsumed by British law, the Maltese legal 
tradition has instead been preserved because of the significant 
degree of autonomy the Maltese people enjoyed under British rule. 
The Maltese legal élite has always supported the idea that the 
Island was neither conquered, nor ceded, nor sold but that it chose 
to be governed by the British Empire.9 
Before detailing some of the legal changes brought about in 
Malta by British rule, some brief remarks are necessary to describe 
the period prior to that time. The Knights of the Gerosolimitan 
Order, also known as the Knights Hospitaller, had gained control 
over Malta in 1530, and it was during this period that the first 
corpus of purely Maltese laws was enacted.10 Before their arrival, 
Malta was a political appendage of Sicily and the laws enacted by 
the Sicilian rulers also applied ipso facto to Malta. The model of 
legislation was based on Roman law, and during the period when 
the Knights were in power, which ended in 1798 with the arrival of 
the French, the Code of Master de Rohan (1784) was of crucial 
importance. A distinguished Maltese author has described this 
code as “a cornerstone of our legal edifice”11 for various reasons. 
                                                                                                             
 9. This position is clearly developed by P. DE BONO, STORIA DELLA 
LEGISLAZIONE IN MALTA 382-384 (1898). As to court judgments, a clear 
example of this attitude can be found in Cassar Desain v. Forbes (Court of 
Appeal, January 7, 1935), reported in W.PH. GULIA, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 
IN MALTA 128 (1974). The political aim lying at the basis of this position was 
that of obtaining the acknowledgement on behalf of Malta of a status different 
from that of an ordinary colony. On the contrary, the British government 
considered Malta a conquered colony or part of the ‘settled colonies’ as those 
founded by English people abroad which enjoyed wider autonomy. The British 
government refused at first to recognize the status of colony sui generis to Malta 
with the 1865 Colonial Laws Validity Act, which ruled the position of the 
Constitutions of the colonies in the frame of the English legal system. The 
Maltese position within the British Empire changed after the enactment of the 
Maltese Constitution of 1921, see F. CREMONA, STORIA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE 
MALTESE (1936). 
 10. See, H.W. HARDING, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW IN MALTA (Malta 
University Press 1950). 
 11. CREMONA, supra note 9, at 75. 
242 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
 
 
First, it is the summa of the whole of legislation enacted during the 
Knight’s rule, secondly because it was the basis of modern law 
developed from the nineteenth century onwards, and finally, 
because various institutions ruled based on this Code, which has 
never been repealed, and form part of the laws still in force. 
At its foundation, one can find clear indications of the 
influence of Sicilian law and Roman Law, as indicated in the law 
of persons, specifically regarding status, family maintenance, 
dowry, succession, property, the laws of organization, procedure 
and in the setting up for commercial causes of a special court 
known as the Consolato del Mare.  
The influence of Roman law did not end with the Knight’s 
rule, and the civil code still in force today draws from Roman law 
the fundamental taxonomies on which it is built. It is important to 
note that in speaking of Roman law, we do not refer only to ‘pure’ 
Roman law, but also to Roman law modified by customs, feudal 
law and, perhaps more importantly, Canon law, a Roman law that 
can be called ius commune because it is common to most of the 
continental nations. 
Roman law has influenced Maltese law in several ways, 
and not only gave Maltese private law its fundamental taxonomies, 
but in the past also served another function, that of a 
supplementary or suppletive law, to which recourse was made in 
cases not provided for by Maltese law.12 The Roman law as ius 
commune is recognizable in many rules of the above mentioned 
Code de Rohan dealing with specific proceedings, contracts, dowry 
and wills. Further, under British Rule there were several cases that 
were decided according to Roman law principles, most notably the 
Steven’s case (1833)13 and the Concorso di creditori della eredità 
                                                                                                             
 12. On the role of Roman law as ius commune in the evolution of Maltese 
legal system, see HARDING, supra note 10, at 55. 
 13. Steven and Chiappe were indicted for forgery and for the writing of a 
public notarial act of enrolment and were found guilty by the Court of Special 
Commission. Stevens then presented a memorial in which he observed that the 
Court was instituted to hear crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment 
but which had no jurisdiction in cases where it was found that the offence 
charged in the indictment against the accused did not merit either of the said 
higher punishment. The case was remanded to His Majesty’s Criminal Court. 
His Majesty’s Government in London, acting on this opinion, released Stevens. 
Maltese Judges did not concur in this opinion because it was  
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di Edward Watson case (1840).14 More recently, recourse has been 
made to Roman law in many other cases.15 The function of Roman 
law of regulating casi omissi has notably whittled down in modern 
times. Nowadays, it still retains the function of source of 
interpretation.16  
 
IV. THE ADVENT OF BRITISH RULE  
AND THE PROCESS OF CODIFICATION 
 
This, then, was the existing framework of law at the 
moment in which the British Empire took control of Malta. The 
British period in Malta started de facto in 1800. However, it began 
de iure only in 1814. Malta, until 1814, had not been formally 
annexed to the British Empire. A Royal Order of 1801 stated that 
English laws and courts of judicature had no jurisdiction over 
Malta, and Maltese law in primis, the Code de Rohan remaining in 
force until annexation. Because of this, institutions were not 
affected. The change of status from Protectorate to Colony was 
effectuated some months before the Treaty of Paris, on October 5, 
1813 through notice given by the British government to the 
Maltese people. Thomas Maitland was appointed Governor of the 
Island and legal reforms based on the English common law were 
introduced concerning the organisation of courts, commercial law, 
bankruptcy and the registering of vessels. 
Since the main focus of this article is the development of 
Maltese private law under British rule, due care has been paid to 
                                                                                                             
 
contrary . . . to the common (civil) or Justinian laws by which 
in cases not provided for by the municipal enactments the 
decisions of criminal cases in these Islands are to be regulated 
. . . and in fact, as has always been, and is now the practice 
constantly observed from time immemorial in all the Tribunals 
of Malta and Gozo, which of itself would constitute in these 
islands a law of custom (common law) which is no less 
binding than the written law. 
 14. In this case, the interest was declared usurious, and Roman legislation 
(Lex 27 Cod.de Usuris) suspending the interest ‘ultra duplum’ was found to be 
still in force in Malta. 
 15. See, Dr. Messina v. Galea, (1881); D’Agata vs. Drago, (1884); De Piro 
v. Delicata, (1885); Zammit v. Scicluna (1864); Concorso dei creditori del Conte 
Manduca (1897). 
 16. HARDING, supra note 10, at 73. 
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the process of codification, given the importance that codes, and 
especially the civil code, had in the evolution of the Maltese legal 
system.  
The process that led to codification is rather long and 
complex.17 It begins with the mission given by King George IV to 
the British lawyer John Richardson in 1824 to enquire into the 
administration of the law in Malta. This report was aimed at 
determining which reforms oriented towards common law were 
possible in Malta. 
In 1831, King William IV appointed a Commission made 
up of four British and three Maltese jurists for the drafting of civil, 
commercial, and criminal codes and of codes of civil and criminal 
procedure. Each code had to be drafted in Italian and to conform to 
the most accredited foreign codes. In 1831, the Commission was 
repealed and replaced by a different Commission. However, in 
1843, that Commission was officially dissolved without having 
done anything significant. Another Commission was formed which 
was composed only of Maltese jurists, because the presence of 
British jurists made it difficult for the new laws to be modelled on 
continental legislation. This Commission also failed, and it was not 
until after 1850 that the process of codification of law came to be 
realized, finally to be accomplished in 1873. 
The British Government gave to the Crown Advocate Sir 
Adriano Dingli18 the task of codifying Maltese law, and this article 
focuses particularly on the Civil Code. Dingli was a profound 
scholar of both Roman law and continental law, having spent a 
long period in Bologna and Heidelberg. He chose to proceed 
gradually by single ordinances, which afterwards were 
consolidated within Ordinance VII 1868 relating to things, 
promulgated on February 11, 1870, and in Ordinance I of 1873 
relating to persons, promulgated on January 22, 1874. These two 
Ordinances cover the whole field of private law, with the exception 
of citizenship and intellectual property rights which were governed 
by English law, and marriage, which is governed by Canon law.  
                                                                                                             
 17. For an interesting account on this topic, see, G. BONELLO, 5 HISTORIES 
OF MALTA: REFLECTIONS AND REJECTIONS 190 (2004). 
 18. For a portrait of Dingli, see J.M. Ganado, Sir Adrian Dingli, 1 L.J. 9 
(1943). 
2011]  THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 245 
 
 
 
The backbone of Dingli’s Civil Code is the Code Napoléon, 
which was not only the most important model among those 
employed for outlining its framework19 but also a highly 
significant source of law. In this regard, specific institutions and 
rules were introduced into Maltese law through the influence of 
French law, such as indivisible obligations, the relevance ipso iure 
of legal compensation, the diligence of bonus pater familias as an 
objective standard, the principle possession vaut titre and so on. 
Furthermore, there has also been, as previously observed, a 
remarkably widespread influence of Roman law covering the law 
of property and succession, except in some parts of the Code 
dealing with the acquisition of ownership of movable property, the 
transfer of ownership following agreements and the effect of 
partition.20 Dingli made detailed notes regarding the foreign 
sources of law he looked at. This manuscript gives precious insight 
into Dingli’s methodology since it allows an understanding of the 
conceptual background of the Civil Code. Some provisions were 
completely new while others are deeply rooted in Maltese legal 
customs.  
From that time, the Maltese Code has remained one of the 
most faithful codes to the original Code Napoleon when compared 
with the civil codes of other civil law systems which have 
undergone revision. In fact, the Maltese Code has remained fairly 
stable. 
 
V. LACUNAE AND JUDGE-MADE LAW 
 
To have a more accurate idea of the way in which the 
Maltese legal system has been influenced and developed through 
case law, one has to examine some instances in which judges have 
filled a gap in the law. The examples I will consider in the 
following pages are related to the law of obligations and to rights 
over things or iura in re. I will start from the field of property and 
then briefly consider an example in tort law, that of moral 
                                                                                                             
 19. Apart from the French Code, other codes were consulted such as the 
civil Codes of Austria, Parma, Two Sicilies, Canton of Ticino, and Albertino. 
 20. HARDING, supra note 10, at 40.  
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damages.21 I will finally turn to the issue of pre-contractual 
liability. While the first two are examples of how courts deal with 
lacunae because a statutory norm is absent and therefore a rule is 
introduced through case law in the legal system, the latter is a 
different example of how judges deal with general rules and 
address cases that are not expressly provided for by written law.  
As to the law of obligations, actio publiciana will be 
considered. In the field of iura in re, the main division is that 
between ownership and possession. The different protection 
afforded by the Maltese Civil Code to owners and possessors is the 
by-product of the sharp distinction between the two positions 
based on substantive grounds. This distinction, deeply rooted in the 
civil law tradition, is predicated on the fact that the owner has a 
right over the thing, whereas the possessor, who is not also owner, 
exercises a power de facto over it. This difference also generates 
separate remedies.  
Actio publiciana, which is not provided for by the Civil 
Code, but admitted by judges, removes the requirement that the 
owner demonstrates the proof of his right, and therefore blurs the 
difference between owner and possessor.  
Judge-made law also has added to the actions provided by 
the Civil Code for the protection of ‘proprietary rights’ in this 
remedy. Only actio rei vindicatoria is ruled as a petitory action 
protecting the right of ownership. It must be kept in mind that an 
action with the same name has been acknowledged in Roman law 
since 67 B.C. An actio in rem given by the judge was the actio 
praetoria to the buyer of a res mancipi, when the thing was 
transferred not through mancipatio, which is the correct mode of 
transferring those things, but through traditio which was used for 
less valuable goods. Through actio publiciana, Roman law 
protected the buyer from third parties claiming a right which may 
be deemed incompatible, as if he had acquired the thing through 
mancipatio. It is uncertain if, and to what extent, Maltese actio 
publiciana is similar to the Roman law remedy with the same 
name. It is still debatable whether in Maltese law this action 
consists of a mitigation of the rigorous proof of ownership that 
                                                                                                             
 21. For a detailed treatment of this topic see the paper by Claude Micallef-
Grimaud in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD. 
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must be given by those claiming to be the owners for the upholding 
of actio rei vindicatoria, or whether it is a completely autonomous 
action from the actio reivindicatoria.  
The first alternative would allow the plaintiff, who claims 
to be the owner and who has acted with reivindicatoria, to change 
his previous claim and act with actio publiciana, when not able to 
prove his title of ownership by simply proving that his title is better 
than that of the defendant under the so called theory of better 
title.22 Under the second option, the plaintiff could directly resort 
to actio publiciana without being compelled to act first with rei 
vindicatoria. However, it is difficult to find cases in which judges 
are favourable to this second option.23   
It is worth citing two recent judgements discussing actio 
publiciana where favour was shown for the first option. In Frank 
Pace et v. Kummissarju ta’L-Artijiet (First Hall Civil Court, 
February 19, 2004), the main issue discussed before the Court was 
who had title to the land. A part of the land was occupied by a 
company and another part by a public road. The plaintiff was 
neither able to prove his title, nor that his title was better than 
others claimants. His claim was consequently rejected both under 
the label of actio reivindicatoria and under that of actio 
publiciana. In Jane Spiteri v. Nicholas u Maria Concetta konjugi 
Camilleri (First Hall Civil Court, November 20, 2006), there was 
uncertainty about a portion of the property because the plaintiff 
and the defendants had both bought property from the same seller. 
The seller sold to the plaintiff in 1983 and the defendants bought in 
1985. The seller’s contract of sale with the plaintiff, contained a 
declaration regarding the part of property that was being 
challenged, that it “is part of the roof of the property sold by me.” 
This, however, for the Court was not sufficient for the plaintiff to 
exercise actio rei vindicatoria. The Court accepted his plea on the 
different grounds of actio publiciana because the title of the 
plaintiff was better than that of the defendant.  
                                                                                                             
 22. It can be open to doubt if this theory as applied by Maltese courts can be 
traced back to Roman law or rather it is influenced by common law doctrines 
acknowledging the ‘better title’ rule.  
 23. P. Bezzina, The Actio Publiciana (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 
2007). 
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The following example, taken from the field of tort law, 
concerns a rule created by Maltese judges, notwithstanding the 
absence of a true gap, concerning the relevance at law of moral 
damages. In the Maltese Civil Code, there is not an express 
provision concerning the issue of recoverability for moral 
damages.24 However, under a general rule stated in art. 1031, 
“every person . . . shall be liable for the damage which occurs 
through his fault.”25 This provision does not limit the 
recoverability of damages to a specific kind of harm, and could be 
considered good grounds for an award of moral damages. To the 
contrary, however, Maltese judges make recourse to art. 1045, 
entitled “Measure of damages,” subsection 1, provides that: 
The damage which is to be made good by the 
person responsible . . . shall consist in the actual 
loss which the act shall have directly caused to the 
injured party, in the expenses which the latter may 
have been compelled to incur in consequence of the 
damage, in the loss of actual wages or other 
earnings and in the loss of future earnings arising 
from any permanent incapacity, total or partial, 
which the act may have caused. 
This grounds a restrictive rule of recoverability of moral 
damages.26 I will not attempt to delve into the rationale of this 
restrictive rule that does not have support either in the literal 
provisions on tort or in the French civil code used as a model for 
the drafting of tort rules.  
The interesting point is that while both instances are rules 
made by Courts, in the latter, judges limit their rulings to the 
                                                                                                             
 24. R. Borg, Moral Damage: A Comparative Study (LL.D. thesis, 
University of Malta, 2008); C. Micallef-Grimaud, The Rationale for Excluding 
Moral Damages from the Maltese Civil Code: A Historical and Legal 
Investigation (LL.D thesis, University of Malta, 2008). 
 25. Art.1032 states that “a person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his 
own acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence and attention of a bonus pater 
familias.” 
 26. In the Maltese legislation, however, specific instances of recovery of 
moral damage can be found in the Consumers Affairs Act, in the Press Act, in 
the Promise of marriage law and in the Enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (regulation) Act. A judge-made rule of recovery of this kind of damages 
exists in human rights cases. 
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restrictive rule concerning moral damages. They disguise the fact 
that they have created new law and present it as the result of the 
direct application of art. 1045. 
  
VI. GOOD FAITH IN CASE-LAW 
 
Under this paragraph some issues will be analysed relating 
to the concept of good faith, which is widely debated among 
scholars of the main legal systems of the western tradition. These 
issues are interesting examples of how Maltese judges address 
situations not expressly provided by the legislature through the 
broad interpretation of existing provisions.  
 
A. The Controversial Issue of Pre-Contractual Liability 
 
Pre-contractual liability is not expressly provided for and 
its existence is still highly controversial.27 It is interesting, 
therefore, to see how Maltese judges cope with the issue of 
awarding damages for damaging conduct occurring during the 
negotiations stage. The most frequent case dealt with by Courts 
under the label of pre-contractual liability is that of the abrupt 
interruption of negotiations. Maltese judgements have adopted two 
opposite approaches to this issue.28 In some cases, courts show 
their disfavour of pre-contractual liability in the light of the 
doctrine of the freedom of will, according to which before the 
conclusion of contract no obligation can arise on behalf of the 
parties to a negotiation. Damages can be claimed only if a contract 
is concluded.29 When this has not occurred individuals cannot 
                                                                                                             
 27. See Alfred Attard v. Paolo Xuereb (First Hall Civil Court, October 13, 
2003); V.J. Bisazza, Precontractual Responsibility (LL.D. thesis, University of 
Malta, 1971); G. Xuereb, A Comparative Study of the Theory of Precontractual 
Responsibility IX ID DRITT L.J. 806 (1978): J. Scicluna, Pre-Contractual 
Liability: Comparative Perspectives (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 2003); 
and S. Vassallo, The Principle of Good Faith in the Negotiation and 
Performance of Contracts: A Comparative Perspective (LL.D. thesis, University 
of Malta, 2010). 
 28. For a clear analysis of the two approaches see, T. Mallia, Pre-
contractual Liability in Malta, in LAW & PRACTICE 25 (2000).  
 29.  “An obligation can only arise with the free and definite consent of the 
individual and if the said individual did not so express his consent, he was not 
bound.” Id. at 26.  
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claim damages against the party who had interrupted negotiations, 
because otherwise no one would negotiate for the fear of being 
held liable for damages.30  
In other cases, judges have found for the victim of pre-
contractual unfairness. These judgments are usually justified in one 
of three ways. First, they may argue for the existence of pre-
contractual agreements,31 in the sense that although a final 
agreement has not been reached yet, negotiations are so advanced 
that a sort of intermediate agreement has been reached. Therefore, 
the interruption of negotiations constitutes a breach of a 
contractual duty. This approach, rather than expressly and directly 
acknowledging pre-contractual liability as such, allows 
recoverability for pre-contractual damages by treating them as 
contractual damages. Alternately, they make recourse to tort law, 
qualifying unfair conduct held during negotiations as an abuse of 
rights, which is expressly provided for by art. 1030.32 This latter 
provision states that “any person who makes use, within the proper 
limits, of a right competent to him, shall not be liable for any 
damages which may result therefrom.” Reasoning a contrario, the 
owner of a right is liable when he exceeds the boundaries of the 
right, and in these cases, pre-contractual liability arises because the 
party who acts in bad faith infringes upon the other party's 
                                                                                                             
 30. This is the rationale underlying Carmel Cassar v. Thomas Colin Ernest 
Campbell Preston noe et (Commercial Court, November 1, 1971); Carmelina 
Busuttil pro et noe et v. Salvatore Muscat noe et, (First Hall Civil Court, 
October  28, 1998): this case is mentioned in Mallia, supra note 28, at 27. 
 31. Mallia explains clearly this approach:  
[A] new general principle was introduced in the law. Not only 
should contracting parties perform their obligations in good 
faith, but the protection of the other party's legitimate 
expectations became paramount. Thus, an agreement could be 
inferred from deeds and attitudes, independently if consent, if 
the other party legitimately and in good faith interprets those 
deeds and actions as meaning an agreement has been reached.  
Id. at 26. 
 32. This provision is drafted in a very general way. Its ambit of application 
has been defined through case law. It was used in the field of the property to fix 
boundaries between neighbours, in the field of abuse of power by public 
authorities and also as limitation on the exercise of a contractual right, in the 
field of human rights. For an example of the application of this doctrine to the 
field of pre-contractual liability, see Bezzina noe vs Direttur tal-Kuntratti (First 
Hall Civil Court, October 12, 2006; confirmed on Appeal, June 26, 2009), that 
awards damages to the victim to the extent of negative interests. 
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legitimate expectations. The tort approach is the approach that had 
gained widespread success in several European countries during 
the twentieth century.33 Finally, the courts extend the ambit of the 
provision of art. 993 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts 
must be carried out in good faith up to the stage of negotiations. 
Several judgements support this view.34 The best way to 
understand the different approaches to pre-contractual liability is 
through examining case law, and the cases that follow are among 
the most significant in this field. In Dr. Biagio Giufridda pro et 
noe v. Onor. Dott.Giorgio Borg Olivier et,35 the Maltese 
government and a private individual entered into negotiations 
concerning two different contracts, the first being a contract of 
emphyteusis and the second a contract of financial grant for the 
construction of a hotel. The government put an abrupt end to 
negotiations. The other party, therefore, requested a judicial 
declaration that the revocation was ineffective and specific 
performance of the contracts mentioned above, but did not ask for 
pre-contractual damages. Although the Court stated that agreement 
on the essential elements of the contract had not been reached, it 
stated the general principle that an unjust or capricious revocation 
makes its author liable for damages incurred by the counterparty in 
the measure of ‘negative interest.’ So in this case, the Court 
implicitly admitted pre-contractual liability and used a well-known 
German theory to quantify damages suffered by the plaintiff 
although it did not qualify this form of liability expressly as pre-
contractual. The reason which led the Court to find in favour of the 
Government is that pre-contractual liability was not claimed by the 
plaintiff and the contracts were not concluded with the defendant. 
In Pullen v. Matysik,36 the plaintiffs entered into 
negotiations with defendants for the concession of the Hilton 
                                                                                                             
 33. Maltese courts have imposed particularly higher degrees of proof than 
those required in other national Courts working in other European systems, J.M. 
GANADO, AN INTRODUCTION TO MALTESE FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 49 (2009). 
 34. GANADO supra note 33 at 50, quotes a number of judgments which are 
on this position: Debattista v. J.K. Properties Ltd (Court of Appeal, December 7, 
2005); Baldacchino v. Chairman of Enemalta (First Hall Civil Court, October 
11, 2006); Scicluna Enterprises (Gozo) Ltd v. Enemalta Corporation (Court of 
Appeal, May 2, 2007). 
 35.  Court of Appeal, March 3, 1967.  
 36.  Commercial Court, October 20, 1969. 
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Boutique of the Malta Hilton. All the essential elements of the 
agreement were fixed but the final contract was never sent and the 
contractual relationship with the previous concessionaires was not 
terminated. The Court found the defendants liable under the 
heading of liability in tort, holding that the defendants had acted 
abusively. This conduct on the part of the defendant, “amounts to 
‘culpa’ in terms of art.1074 of the Civil Code which in turn renders 
them liable because there was, “at least negligence or imprudence 
on this part . . . when [t]he[y] assured the plaintiffs that they would 
unfailingly have the boutique, when in fact they w[ere] not in a 
position to give it to them.” As to damages, they were restricted to 
the actual losses suffered by the plaintiffs and consisted of 
expenses incurred and depreciation of materials, but did not 
include lost profits.  
In Elia Grixti v. Mark Grech,37 the plaintiff stated that he 
had agreed to look for an apartment for the defendant, an estate 
agent, and on finding such an apartment, he was to inform the 
defendant so that the latter would purchase it. Sometime after 
having informed the defendant that he had found the apartment, 
the plaintiff found out that, following a conversation between the 
parties, the defendant had bought the apartment directly from the 
owner. Thus, the plaintiff sued him on the grounds that the 
defendant disrupted the transaction that he was about to enter into 
with him. The Court, while stating that the remedy of damages is 
generally awarded for pre-contractual liability when the party 
withdraws capriciously or in bad faith, or the negotiations are in 
such an advanced stage because there is agreement on the 
essential elements of the bargain to create a legitimate expectation 
on the conclusion of the contract, dismissed the action of the 
plaintiff because none of the requisites for the action were met. 
In Caroline Ebejer v. Joseph Frendo,38 there was a promise 
for the sale of land for which the buyer had given a deposit. The 
seller mala fide was silent regarding the fact that he was only the 
co-owner of the land and that therefore he could not transfer the 
ownership of the land without the consent of the other owner. The 
Court excluded the possibility of a transfer of the ownership, but 
                                                                                                             
 37.  First Hall Civil Court, April 3, 1998. 
 38.  Court of Appeal, April 18, 2002. 
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found for pre-contractual liability by the seller, if not expressly 
qualified in this way, on the grounds of the abuse of rights. 
Liability was therefore based on tort law rules. 
In Café Bar (Malta) Limited v. Alfred Caruana,39 a 
company sought to employ a person, but before formal 
employment, sent him to Holland to follow a training course. 
When the worker came back to Malta he decided to return to his 
previous employer. In this case, the contract of employment had 
not been concluded. The company sued him for damages resulting 
from travel expenses, which occurred before the contract of 
employment was concluded, thus suggesting a theory of pre-
contractual liability. The First Hall of the Civil Court and the 
Court of Appeal, however, dealt with the issue on the ground of 
contractual liability stating that a sort of agreement, different from 
the contract of employment and concerning only the training 
course in Holland, had been concluded and found for the liability 
of the private party by awarding damages to the company for a 
partial amount of the expenses incurred by the latter. Although a 
final contract of employment had not been signed, a legitimate 
expectation had been created towards the conclusion of contract. 
The Court did not make express reference to pre-contractual 
liability, nor there was any reference to good faith. 
In Attard v. Xuereb,40 the parties had agreed between 
themselves to assign the property of the defendant on a contract of 
lease to the plaintiff for use as a confectionery shop. All elements 
having been defined, the contract had only to be signed. The 
plaintiff took several people to see the tenement in order to carry 
out works on it and applied for planning permission. The 
defendant, after having refused to give the keys to the plaintiff 
saying that the contract was not still concluded, entered into an 
agreement with third parties notwithstanding the fact that the date 
for the final contract with the plaintiff had been fixed.41 
            The plaintiff claimed damages for expenses incurred during 
negotiations. The Court stated that for pre-contractual liability to 
                                                                                                             
 39.  Court of Appeal, May 24, 2002. 
 40.  First Hall Civil Court, October 13, 2003. 
 41. It has to be clarified whether a previous date had been fixed, but the 
contract could not be concluded because the plaintiff's wife, whose signature 
was necessary, was not present. 
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be established, the negotiations had to be terminated in order for 
one of the parties to have acted with dolus. Damages would be 
limited to necessary expenses incurred during negotiations and 
would not include loss of future earnings. Although the Court 
stated that the termination of negotiations was unjustified, it did 
not award damages because the expenses incurred by the plaintiff 
were not necessary.  
Baldacchino noe v.Chairman tal-Korporazjoni Enemalta 
et,42 concerned a call for tender for the supply of sulphuric acid. 
The plaintiff received two offers and after notification that their 
offer was declined, the company instituted a court action. The 
Court admitted damages, holding that it is possible to award 
damages prior to the creation of a contractual relationship, basing 
its reasoning on good faith as a standard of conduct at the pre-
contractual stage as well as in the conclusion of contract. 
Presently, none of these approaches regarding the issue of 
pre-contractual liability has widespread prevalence, and the 
approach based on the theory of will has not yet been definitely 
abandoned. However, what can be said is that allowing an action 
for pre-contractual damages produces a restriction on the freedom 
of the will of the individual, in as much as one can be held bound 
towards another person when not tied by a contract, if the latter has 
been damaged by having relied in good faith on the conduct of the 
other party. This shift from the theory of will to the theory of 
reliance has been explained in this way, “people began to abuse of 
the will theory and juggle their consent to the detriment of the lone 
individual consumer, who was easily led astray and had little 
protection from the law.”43 
 
B. Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts as a Tool of 
Redressing Contractual Obligations 
 
The third approach followed by Courts regarding the 
recoverability of pre-contractual damages based on the concept of 
good faith can be seen as evidence of the continued favor for this 
                                                                                                             
 42. First Hall Civil Court, October 11, 2006. 
 43. Mallia, supra note 28, at 26.  
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principle in general.44 Pre-contractual liability is not the only 
example in which judges make use of this principle, and it has 
been recently considered in various situations, including being 
used as a tool to redress the obligations taken by parties through 
contract. This would seemingly lead to lack of good faith not only 
in the case of fraud, but also in the case of inequitable behaviour. 
In Pace v. Micallef,45 the issue was the exorbitant measure of a 
penalty clause and whether judges could reduce it. The Court 
found on the basis of the principle of good faith in that the penalty 
was disproportionate to the delays of which one of the defendants 
was charged and reduced the amount notwithstanding the lack of 
an express provision. The clause of good faith would impose an 
evaluation of the behaviour of the parties in the light of what is 
thought to be fair according to social standards, normi stabiliti tas-
socjeta, and to legal logic, logika guridika. In this case, good faith 
was used by Courts to reduce the entity of the burden lying on the 
defendant arising from the contract. 
In Psaila v. Spiteri,46 the concept of good faith was used in 
a commercial partnership formed for the sale of beer and other 
products by Simonds Farsons Cisk Ltd. The defendant, the 
administrator of the commercial partnership, without the 
knowledge of the other partner, concurrently accepted agency for 
Coca Cola. The Court found that, without excluding the 
defendant's liberty to commit to other commercial practices, it was 
the nature of the contract between plaintiff and defendant to forbid 
                                                                                                             
 44. According to Teubner, good faith displays three functions: 1) expansion 
and establishment of contractual duties such as the duties of performance, of 
information and of protection; 2) limitation of contractual rights. This function is 
deeply entrenched within the doctrine of abuse of rights; 3) transformation of 
contracts, when there are supervening events producing imbalance of the 
equivalence, or frustration of contractual purpose. The legal transplant of the 
clause of good faith from civil law to common law systems is not easy because 
the principle is linked in continental countries to processes of economic 
production based on cooperation that are totally different from those featuring in 
common law countries based on market competition. The transplant would have 
as a result not the enhancement of cooperation but simply an increase of the 
judiciary intervention in the sphere of individuals. See G. Teubner, Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New 
Divergences, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 244 (F. Snyder ed., Hart, 2000).  
 45. Court of Appeal, June 15, 2001. 
 46. Court of Appeal, Commercial, February 12, 1965. 
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other commercial activities that could damage the partnership. 
Damages were awarded, but loss of profits was not included.  
Good faith has also been used by Maltese Courts as a tool 
to pierce the veil of separate corporate personality when a juridical 
personality is used with the aim of committing abuses or 
committing illegal acts. In Avukat Dr.Herrera et v. Tabone et 
noe,47 the defendants attempted to hide behind a company in order 
to evade contractual obligations. This was considered an 
infringement of the principle that all contracts must be performed 
in good faith. In this case the defendant formed a company simply 
to evade the obligations taken towards the plaintiff not to employ 
employees from the plaintiff’s company. The Court of Appeal 
found for the plaintiff and ordered the payment of the penalty 
contained in the clause which was breached. In absence of legal 
provisions, good faith can also serve as a source for ruling on the 
duties and rights of the parties to a contract.  
 These concepts are also applied to contracts of insurance. 
Although the Maltese insurance business is a highly regulated area 
of trade, the law regulating insurance contracts inhabits a legal 
vacuum. There is only one law concerning marine insurance 
enacted in 1858 and later inserted into the commercial code, but in 
any case, the Maltese commercial code cannot be considered the 
source for the general regulation of contracts of insurance. In fact, 
whereas the Maltese Civil Code is the general law applying in all 
cases unless expressly excluded by a specific law, the Commercial 
Code is specific law that is limited in its scope to regulating 
“objective acts of trade” and situations involving traders acting in 
the pursuit of their business. The acts of insurance are not 
considered by Courts to be acts of trade,48 so section 3 of the 
Commercial Code cannot be applied to the contract of insurance in 
general.49 Trade practices cannot be considered the source of law 
regulating the contract, so insurance contracts theoretically should 
fall under the Civil Code, which does not include express 
                                                                                                             
 47. Court of Appeal, January 22, 1992. 
 48. To this regard, see Frendo Azopardi v Colborne England (Commercial 
Court, October 2, 1907). 
 49. The Commercial code provides that “in commercial matters, the 
commercial law shall apply. Provided that where no provision is made in such 
law, the usages of trade or, in the absence of such usages, the civil law shall 
apply.”  
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provisions on that matter. Therefore, the source to deal with the 
contracts of insurance has to be found elsewhere.  
Courts have filled this gap by referring primarily to English 
jurisprudence. From this case law, Maltese Courts have drawn the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, and although English law exerts a 
considerable influence on Maltese law, the latter is not a carbon 
copy of the former. It must be stressed that, since the general 
principles of Maltese private law have to be found in the civil 
code, the doctrine of utmost good faith in Maltese law should be 
interpreted in the light of the civil code. So although Maltese law 
understands the duty of utmost good faith, this duty is rationalised 
from the perspective of vitiation of consent, of error and fraud.  
Furthermore, Maltese insurance law departs from English 
law under various aspects such as the materiality of the 
information,50 the concept of error,51 the extent of fraud and the 
requirements of diligence and inducement. From the combination 
of these doctrines, both parties, not only the insured, would be 
subject to heavy contractual duties concerning the disclosure of all 
the information regarding the subject matter of the contract but in 
practice the party on which the burden rests in a more significant 
way is the insured. The example of the contract of insurance is an 
interesting example both because it shows the importance of good 
faith but also because it reveals Maltese judicial attitudes regarding 
the use and adaptation of foreign models to the Maltese legal 
environment. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
At this point, some conclusions can be made. In Malta, the 
important role of ‘system-builder’ is played by judges, 
notwithstanding the absence of a doctrine of binding precedent. As 
to whether or not private law presently follows continental law, the 
short examination of the evolution of some areas of private law has 
shown that it has not necessarily changed away from its continental 
foundation. The way in which judges deal with the issues outlined 
                                                                                                             
 50. Zammit v. Micallef (Commercial Court, January 31, 1952); Tanti v. 
O.F. Gollcher (Civil Court, April 30, 2002). 
 51. Briffa v. Camilleri (Court of Appeal, February 9, 2001). 
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above reveals that they do not necessarily follow continental law, 
exclusively, but rather are pragmatic. It is possible to find 
references to civilian theories, but also to original solutions that are 
deeply rooted in the Maltese legal tradition.  
Maltese judges do not necessarily address private law 
issues by making recourse to the same legal traditions which guide 
the legal field to which the issue is related. Furthermore, foreign 
law that has been accepted as a source of Maltese private law does 
not always repeal Maltese common law.  
One of the most eminent law scholars of the end of the 
nineteenth century, Judge Paolo De Bono in his work on the 
history of Maltese legislation, observed that the rule of Code de 
Rohan concerning a situation which cannot be resolved with regard 
to local laws so must be determined by application of common 
law, was never repealed as to private law and therefore has to be 
applied. Also, customs fall within the “local laws,” and are 
interpreted in their widest meaning. They are acknowledged by 
Roman and Sicilian law, and are also nowadays legally binding.52 
This passage has been quoted by later jurists many times and has 
exerted considerable influence on them. In support of the 
aforesaid, De Bono referred to parr.37, capo VIII, and 27, Capo 
IX, Libro I of Code de Rohan, ruling respectively the ‘Supremo 
Magistrato di Giustizia’ and the President of the latter in which 
reference was made to what he considered as Maltese sources of 
law.53 But upon a more careful reading of these provisions, one 
                                                                                                             
 52. DE BONO, supra note 9, at 383. The original text in Italian reads:  
Il precetto del codice de Rohan, che qualora una controversia 
non possa essere decisa con una disposizione delle leggi 
municipali, si deve avere riguardo alle leggi comuni, non fu 
mai per le materie civili abrogata, e tuttora si applica. Sotto la 
espressione leggi municipali, presa nella sua ampia 
significazione, viene anche la consuetudine, la quale, 
riconosciuta dal diritto romano e dal diritto siculo, continua 
pure oggidì ad essere ritenuta come una norma giuridica.  
 53. Par. XXVII states that the President of the Supremo Magistrato di 
Giustizia “userà ogni diligenza, perché fia a tutti con prontezza e celerità 
possibile amministrata la giustizia, a tenore del prescritto in questa nuova 
Compilazione di Prammatiche, ed in loro difetto da quello che preferivano le 
leggi dette comuni; ed in affari marittimi, dagli usi e stabilimenti del Consolato 
generale del mare, e ne'casi controversi dalle oppinioni de' Supremi e più 
accreditati Tribunali.” In English this passage reads: “Will take every care so 
that the administration of justice will be as most effective as possible, in 
accordance to this legislation, and in the case of lack of an express provision, 
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discovers that, when these provisions make reference to leggi 
municipali, that is Maltese written law pre-existing to the 
enactment to the Code de Rohan, leggi comuni, common laws and 
as extrema ratio to opinioni abbracciate ne' supremi e più 
accreditati Tribunali or judgements of foreign courts, they 
probably do so with a different aim from that of the eminent 
Maltese author. These provisions intend to avoid, or rather, to 
reduce, the risk of an arbitrary, capricious and inefficient exercise 
of the power of administering justice, so that the references are 
aimed at individuating some binding criteria for judges. However, 
De Bono goes much further by giving to the provisions, and 
especially to the leggi municipali, a wider meaning which is 
relevant not only for judgements but, more generally, for the entire 
legal system. The aim of De Bono is to create a bar to legal 
developments driven by foreign influences which are not coherent 
with the fundamental principles rooted in Maltese legal history. 
The key to understanding De Bono’s book is most probably 
evidenced by the emphasis put on the degree of resistance by the 
Maltese legal tradition to foreign influences. This is due to the fact 
that the Maltese system has kept its own identity, notwithstanding 
the fact that subsequent foreign powers have gained control of 
Malta in the past.54 We can say then that his ‘history,’ far from 
being merely a neutral account of the legal changes that have 
affected the Island, has a ‘political’ background. When he speaks 
about French domination, he explains the reasons for its failure, 
and bases his contention on the fact that the French people wanted 
to impose their law through strength by challenging the role played 
by the Church and through the introduction of reforms that, 
                                                                                                             
 
according to common law in shipping business, from the usage of the Consolato 
generale del mare and in controversial cases from the opinions of the Supreme 
and most authoritative Courts;” par.XXXVII states that the judges of the 
Tribunale Collegiato “né potranno servirsi di veruna potestà arbitraria, quante 
volte non sarà regolata da quello che si dispone dalle leggi municipali, ed in loro 
difetto dalle leggi comuni, e ne'casi controversi e dubbi dalle oppinioni 
abbracciate ne' Supremi e più accreditati tribunal.” In English this passage reads: 
“Cannot administer justice arbitrarily when their power is not ruled by the laws 
of the Island, and in case of the absence of common law, and in controversial 
cases from the opinions of the Supreme and the most authoritative Courts.” 
 54. The same aim inspired the work of A. MICALLEF, NOTES TO CODE DE 
ROHAN (1843). 
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although advanced for the time in which they were proposed, were 
not in harmony with Maltese society.55  
In my opinion, Maltese judges also have this attitude. In 
some cases, as previously discussed, foreign law has been 
followed, while in others, an original solution has been adopted. 
Even when reference is made to foreign models, this has not 
produced an all-encompassing acceptance of the same models. 
Judges have acted to make the external sources consistent with the 
local legal framework. This could be a clear sign of a rooted 
attitude tending towards the preservation of the legal tradition of 
the island. 
 
                                                                                                             
 55. It could seem paradoxical that while French domination was rejected, 
French legal culture was absorbed. The Civil Code is the most evident proof of 
this. 
